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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge 
 
 In this government appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, we 
must decide if a motion for reconsideration, filed after the 
statutory appeal period elapsed but considered on the merits, 
nonetheless keeps the appeal period from expiring.  Section 
3731 imposes a thirty-day filing requirement, which can be 
stopped by a timely filed motion for reconsideration.  In this 
case, the government filed a motion for reconsideration more 
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than thirty days after the District Court entered an order 
granting defendant-appellee Eric Kalb’s motion to suppress.  
The District Court denied the motion for reconsideration on 
the merits, and the government appealed both orders.   
 
Based on the statute’s text and structure, recent 
clarifying opinions from the Supreme Court, and legislative 
history, we believe the thirty-day period for appeal in § 3731 
is jurisdictional.  As to the timeliness of the government’s 
motion, we conclude that a timely motion for reconsideration 
under § 3731, for the purpose of rendering the order non-
final, is one made within the thirty-day appeal period.  To 
hold otherwise would rejuvenate an extinguished appeal 
period.  Accordingly, we will dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 
the government’s appeal of the order granting Kalb’s 
suppression motion.  We will affirm the denial of the 
government’s motion for reconsideration.   
 
I. 
 Eric Kalb was stopped by Upper Merion Township 
police in the early morning hours of September 13, 2014.  
Prior to that stop, around 4:00 a.m., an unidentified caller to 
the Upper Montgomery County 911 Call Center reported that 
a man had been electrocuted near Valley Forge Park.  He also 
stated the man “may have been scrapping.”1  App. 289.  
When asked for details, the caller was elusive.  He claimed he 
was calling from a store but that the store was closing.  He 
also refused to give his name and professed ignorance of the 
                                              
1 “Scrapping” refers to the removal and sale of salvageable 
scrap metals.  “Scrapping” can be criminal if the metals are 
removed from private property.   
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model of vehicle he was driving.  Police were sent to the 
scene of the electrocution and to the unidentified caller’s 
location, which police identified as a fast food restaurant.  At 
Valley Forge Park, officers found a deceased man next to an 
electrical box.   
 
 At the restaurant, the responding officer spoke with a 
security guard who said a white male driving a small Ford 
pickup truck had recently used the phone and driven away 
onto Markley Street.  The identifying information was 
broadcast over the police radio.  Approximately four minutes 
later and only four blocks from the unidentified caller’s 
location, an officer spotted a vehicle matching the broadcast 
description—driven by Kalb—and stopped it.  Kalb 
immediately admitted he was the caller and his friend had 
been electrocuted.  He was taken to the Upper Merion 
Township police station to give a statement.  Kalb admitted to 
driving his friend to the scrapping location, seeing his friend 
“sitting in front of an electrical box” while it “was sparking,” 
and driving to use a payphone to call 911.  App. 85.   
 
 Kalb was indicted by a grand jury on charges of 
depredation against United States property, 18 U.S.C. § 1361; 
destruction of property on United States land, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1363; and aiding and abetting, 18 U.S.C. § 2.2     
 
 Subsequently, Kalb filed a pretrial motion to suppress 
                                              
2 The District Court dismissed the § 1361 count for failure to 




evidence obtained after police stopped his vehicle.3  After 
conducting a suppression hearing, the court entered an order 
granting the motion on October 21, 2016, followed by a 
written opinion three days later. 
 
 The District Court held a conference call with counsel 
and scheduled a status conference for November 29.  During 
the conference call, the government “sought leave to review 
the transcript of the suppression hearing before proceeding.”  
App. 13.  On November 29, the government filed a motion to 
reconsider the suppression order, and Kalb objected to its 
filing as untimely.  The District Court denied the motion to 
reconsider its suppression order, thereby confirming its 
suppression of the challenged evidence, on January 13, 2017.  
In doing so, it rejected the defense’s untimeliness argument: 
 
Preliminarily, the defense argues that the 
Motion should be rejected as untimely.  I 
disagree.  In a conference call with the Court on 
October 29, 2016, the Government made clear 
that it sought leave to review the transcript of 
the suppression hearing before proceeding, and 
the Court scheduled a status conference for 
November 29.  At a minimum, it would be 
understandable if the Government interpreted 
the Court’s actions as granting it a 30-day 
extension.  The transcript became available on 
November 14, and the Government’s Motion 
was filed on November 29, after providing 
                                              
3 Kalb sought suppression of his statements to police and 
physical evidence, specifically window panes found in the 
bed of his pickup truck.   
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notice to the Court that it would be slightly 
delayed because of a competing trial listing.  
Rigid enforcement of the Local Rule[4] 
governing timeliness of motions for 
reconsideration would be inconsistent with the 
collegial manner in which counsel have dealt 
with each other, and dealt with the Court. 
 
App. 13.  On February 10, the government filed a notice of 
appeal from the orders granting suppression and denying 
reconsideration.   
 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  Our jurisdiction over the government’s appeal of the 
suppression order is contested but would arise under 18 
U.S.C. § 3731.  We exercise plenary review over the question 
of whether a notice of appeal was timely filed.  State Nat’l 
Ins. Co. v. County of Camden, 824 F.3d 399, 404 (3d Cir. 
2016). 
 
We have jurisdiction under § 3731 to review the 
District Court’s order denying the government’s motion for 
reconsideration.  “We review the denial of a motion for 
reconsideration for abuse of discretion.”  United States v. 
                                              
4 Local Criminal Rule for the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 1.2 adopts Local Civil 
Rule 7.1(g) covering motions for reconsideration.  Per Local 
Civil Rule 7.1(g), motions for reconsideration must be served 
and filed within fourteen days after entry of the order 
concerned.   
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Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 732 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 
III.  
 Under § 3731, the government is permitted to file 
interlocutory appeals of district court orders suppressing or 
excluding evidence: 
 
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a 
court of appeals from a decision or order of a 
district court suppressing or excluding evidence 
or requiring the return of seized property in a 
criminal proceeding, not made after the 
defendant has been put in jeopardy and before 
the verdict or finding on an indictment or 
information, if the United States attorney 
certifies to the district court that the appeal is 
not taken for purpose of delay and that the 
evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material 
in the proceeding. . . . 
 
The appeal in all such cases shall be taken 
within thirty days after the decision, judgment 
or order has been rendered and shall be 
diligently prosecuted. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3731 (emphasis added).   
A. 
 We must first determine whether the thirty-day 
limitation in § 3731 is a jurisdictional or a claim-processing 
rule before addressing the timeliness of the government’s 
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motion for reconsideration.  The parties agree the appeal 
period is jurisdictional.  Appellee’s Response Br. at 16; 
Appellant’s Reply Br. at 1.  We likewise conclude it is. 
 
 The distinction between a jurisdictional rule and a 
claim-processing rule is significant.  Objections based on a 
tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, see 
Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153 
(2013), and courts are obligated to raise jurisdictional issues 
sua sponte if not raised by the parties, see Hamer v. 
Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2017).  
Further, courts may not extend jurisdictional deadlines for 
equitable reasons.  See United States v. Wong, 135 S. Ct. 
1625, 1631 (2015).  By contrast, a claim-processing rule 
serves “to promote the orderly progress of litigation by 
requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at 
certain specified times.”  Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 17 (quoting 
Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 
(2011)).  “[P]roperly invoked,” such rules “must be enforced, 
but they may be waived or forfeited” if not raised.  See id. 
(citing Manrique v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1266, 1271–72) 
(2017)).  If not barred by Congress, the failure to comply with 
claim-processing rules may be excused by courts.  See Wong, 
135 S. Ct. at 1631; see also Rubel v. Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue, 856 F.3d 301, 304 (3d Cir. 2017).   
         
 To determine if a statutory deadline is jurisdictional, 
we evaluate the “text, context, and relevant historical 
treatment.”  Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 
166 (2010) (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 
U.S. 385, 393–95 (1982)).  The analysis is not always 
straightforward.  As the Supreme Court has observed, 
“[w]hile perhaps clear in theory, the distinction between 
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jurisdictional conditions and claim-processing rules can be 
confusing in practice.  Courts—including this Court—have 
sometimes mischaracterized claim-processing rules or 
elements of a cause of action as jurisdictional limitations.”  
Id. at 161 (citing Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511–
12 (2006)).   
 
We are guided in our inquiry by the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007).5  In Bowles, 
the Supreme Court addressed the ability of a district court to 
reopen the period for appeal in civil cases.  See id. at 207, 
                                              
5 Bowles followed two cases, Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 
(2004), and Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12 (2005) 
(per curiam), in which the Supreme Court attempted to clarify 
its previous, “less than meticulous” use of the term 
“jurisdictional.”  Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 454.  In Kontrick, the 
Court held that the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure’s 
time constraints for objections to discharge are not 
jurisdictional.  See id.  The time limits at issue were 
“prescribed by [the Supreme Court] for ‘the practice and 
procedure in cases under title 11.’”  Id. at 453 (quoting 28 
U.S.C. § 2075).  By contrast, the statutory provision granting 
jurisdiction did not include a time limitation.  Id.  The 
Supreme Court built on that reasoning in Eberhart.  It held 
that the time limitation on motions for a new trial under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 is not jurisdictional, 
see Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 19, because it “closely parallel[ed]” 
the rule in Kontrick, which was not derived from a statute, id. 
at 15.  In doing so, it referenced the “imprecision” of the use 
of “the term ‘jurisdictional’ to describe emphatic time 
prescriptions in rules of court.”  Id. at 18 (quoting Kontrick, 
540 U.S. at 454).      
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209.  By statute, implemented through Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6), a “district court may reopen the 
time to file an appeal for a period of 14 days after the date 
when its order to reopen is entered.”  Bowles, 551 U.S. at 
208; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c).  But, by order, the district 
court in Bowles reopened the appeal period for seventeen 
days.  551 U.S. at 207.  The appeal was filed within that 
seventeen-day window but outside of the statutorily set period 
of fourteen days.  Id.  The Supreme Court concluded the 
fourteen-day period was jurisdictional and the appeal was 
untimely filed.  See id. at 213–14.  
 
 In reaching that conclusion, the Court emphasized the 
source of the period for appeal and the Court’s prior treatment 
of appeal periods.  First, the fourteen-day period was 
grounded in a statute rather than in a procedural rule.  The 
Court noted the “jurisdictional distinction between court-
promulgated rules and limits enacted by Congress.”  Id. at 
211–12.  It reasoned, “[b]ecause Congress specifically limited 
the amount of time by which district courts can extend the 
notice-of-appeal period in § 2107(c), that limitation is more 
than a simple ‘claim-processing rule.’”  Id. at 213.  Second, 
the Court drew on its historic treatment of periods for appeal 
stating, “[t]his Court has long held that the taking of an 
appeal within the prescribed time is ‘mandatory and 
jurisdictional.’”  Id. at 209 (quoting Griggs v. Provident 
Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982) (per curiam)).  
The longstanding-treatment of statutorily prescribed appeal 
periods as jurisdictional reflects Congress’s ability to 
“prohibit[ ] federal courts from adjudicating an otherwise 
legitimate ‘class of cases’ after a certain period has elapsed 
from final judgment.”  Id. at 213.  The Supreme Court 
recently clarified in Hamer that “[i]f a time prescription 
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governing the transfer of adjudicatory authority from one 
Article III court to another appears in a statute, the limitation 
is jurisdictional.”  138 S. Ct. at 20.      
     
Following the decision in Bowles, we have treated time 
limits set by statutes as jurisdictional in several cases.  See 
Ragguette v. Premier Wines & Spirits, 691 F.3d 315, 322–23 
(3d Cir. 2012) (concluding thirty-day limit in Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) is jurisdictional because it 
originates in 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)); Baker v. United States, 
670 F.3d 448, 453–60 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that the 180-
day limit in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6) and 
derived from 28 U.S.C. § 2107 is jurisdictional based on 
Bowles); In re Caterbone, 640 F.3d 108, 111–12 (3d Cir. 
2011) (stating, because 28 U.S.C. § 158 requires that an 
appeal be taken in the time provided by Federal Rule of 
Bankruptcy Procedure 8002, the time period in Rule 8002 is 
jurisdictional); cf. Mathias v. Superintendent Frackville SCI, 
876 F.3d 462, 470–72 (3d Cir. 2017) (concluding the period 
for filing a cross-appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(a)(3) is not jurisdictional because it is not 
derived from a statute).6     
                                              
6 Courts of Appeals have split on this issue.  Compare, e.g., 
Stephanie–Cardona LLC v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 
476 F.3d 701, 705 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding Rule 4(a)(3) 
nonjurisdictional); Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin, 468 F.3d 144, 
162 (2d Cir. 2006) (same); Spann v. Colonial Vill., Inc., 899 
F.2d 24, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (same), with, e.g., Jackson v. 
Humphrey, 776 F.3d 1232, 1238 n.6 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding 
Rule 4(a)(3) jurisdictional); Art Midwest Inc. v. Atl. Ltd. 
P’ship XII, 742 F.3d 206, 213 (5th Cir. 2014) (same); 
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 As in Bowles, the thirty-day appeal period here is 
derived from a statute.  See § 3731.  Moreover, the appeal 
period is included in the same statutory section as the grant of 
jurisdiction to courts of appeals.  In Wong, the Supreme Court 
reiterated the “separation of a filing deadline from a 
jurisdictional grant indicates that the time bar is not 
jurisdictional,” 135 S. Ct. at 1633, when analyzing the time 
limits contained in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), id. at 
1629.  The FTCA provides a tort claim against the United 
States must be brought “within two years after such claim 
accrues” and presented to a federal court “within six months” 
following the agency’s adjudication.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2401(b).  While the time limitations are contained in 
§ 2401(b), the grant of jurisdiction to federal district courts to 
hear FTCA claims is included in a different section of Title 
28.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1); Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1633.  
Recognizing “the structural divide built into the statute,” the 
Court concluded that “[n]othing conditions the jurisdictional 
grant on the limitations periods, or otherwise links those 
separate provisions.”  Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1633; see also Reed 
Elsevier, 559 U.S. at 161–65 (concluding that the location of 
a registration requirement in a different section than the grant 
of jurisdiction suggested the requirement was not 
jurisdictional). 
 
 In contrast to the timing requirements at issue in both 
Wong and Reed Elsevier, the thirty-day appeal period here is 
embedded in the same statutory section that grants 
jurisdiction to the court of appeals.  From the Criminal 
                                                                                                     
Sullivan v. City of Augusta, 511 F.3d 16, 32 n.7 (1st Cir. 
2007) (same).  
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Appeals Act’s passage in 1907, the appeal period has 
remained in the same section as the jurisdictional grant.  
Compare Criminal Appeals Act, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246 
(1907), with 18 U.S.C. § 3731.  Thus, treating the appeal 
period as jurisdictional does not disregard any “structural 
divide built into the statute.”  Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1633.   
    
Further, the provision utilizes mandatory, rather than 
permissive, terms.  While the word “jurisdiction” is not 
included in the appeal-period provision, Congress is not 
required to “incant magic words in order to speak clearly.”  
Auburn Regional, 568 U.S. at 153.  The provision provides 
“[t]he appeal in all such cases shall be taken within thirty 
days after the decision.”  § 3731 (emphasis added).  Although 
not determinative, the “mandatory word ‘shall’ . . . [is a] 
word[ ] with jurisdictional import.”  Auburn Regional, 568 
U.S. at 154.  The nature of the prescribed time period in 
§ 3731 persuades us that the thirty-day limit is jurisdictional.  
That conclusion comports with the Supreme Court’s 
“longstanding treatment of statutory time limits for taking an 
appeal as jurisdictional.”  Bowles, 551 U.S. at 210.7  
                                              
7 In Henderson, the Supreme Court concluded the period for 
appeal from the Board of Veterans’ Appeals to Veterans 
Court is not jurisdictional.  562 U.S. at 441.  But Henderson 
involved an appeal from an agency to an Article I tribunal—
not from a district court to a court of appeals.  Id. at 437–38.  
The Supreme Court drew on that difference when 
distinguishing Bowles and concluding that the limitation at 
issue in Henderson was not jurisdictional.  Id. at 436 
(“Bowles concerned an appeal from one court to another 




Our conclusion is bolstered by the legislative history 
of § 3731.  Prior to passage of the first Criminal Appeals Act 
in 1907, the Supreme Court held the government was not 
permitted to appeal in a criminal case absent express statutory 
authority to do so.  See United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 
321–23 (1892).  With the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907, 
Congress expressly provided the government with the right to 
appeal to the Supreme Court or the circuit courts of appeals in 
specified circumstances and stated that “the writ of error in all 
such cases shall be taken within thirty days after the decision 
or judgment has been rendered and shall be diligently 
prosecuted and shall have precedence over all other cases.”  
Criminal Appeals Act, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246 (1907) 
(emphasis added).  In particular, the Act allowed the 
government to appeal from dismissal of an indictment, if the 
underlying challenge was based on “the invalidity, or 
construction of the statute upon which the indictment is 
founded.”  Id.  The House of Representatives initially passed 
a version of the bill granting the government the “same right 
of review by writ of error that is given to the defendant.”  
H.R. Res. 15434, 59th Cong., 40 Cong. Rec. 5408 (1906).   
 
Following amendment by the Senate, the Act was 
narrowed to not extend the same appeal rights to the 
government and to provide that government appeals should 
be taken within thirty days.  H.R. Rep. 59-8113, at 2 (1907) 
(Conf. Rep.).  In United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531 (1944), 
the Supreme Court interpreted the thirty-day appeal period, 
explaining that “[n]either the District Court nor this court has 
                                                                                                     
American courts’ on which Bowles relied involved appeals of 
that type.” (quoting Bowles, 551 U.S. at 209–210 & 209 n.2)).   
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power to extend the period.”  Id. at 533.  
 
The first Act proved to be unworkable in practice, with 
the Supreme Court commenting that it “reflect[ed] no 
coherent allocation of appellate responsibility” and was “a 
most unruly child that has not improved with age.”  United 
States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 307 (1970).  In 1970, Congress 
significantly amended the Act as part of the Omnibus Crime 
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-644, 84 Stat. 1880.  In so 
doing, it brought the language of the Act into accordance with 
common usage, expanded the government’s ability to appeal, 
provided for review by the courts of appeals over orders 
previously designated for Supreme Court review, and added 
that the Act should be liberally construed.  See S. Rep. No. 
91-1296, at 2 (1970).  However, Congress did not alter the 
requirement that such an appeal be diligently prosecuted.  
H.R. Res. 17825, 91st Cong. § 42 (1970).   
 
While Congress overhauled the statute in other 
respects, it left the thirty-day appeal period intact, despite 
prior treatment of that appeal period as jurisdictional by the 
Supreme Court.  Its only amendment to the thirty-day 
provision was changing the phrase “decision or judgment” to 
“decision, judgment or order.”  Id.  Congress’s retention of 
the thirty-day period without alteration provides additional 
support for the conclusion that the period is jurisdictional.  
See Henderson, 562 U.S. at 436 (“When a long line of this 
Court’s decisions left undisturbed by Congress has treated a 
similar requirement as jurisdictional, we will presume that 
Congress intended to follow that course.” (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted)); see also Lorillard v. Pons, 434 
U.S. 575, 580 (1978) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of 
an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to 
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adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without 
change.”).  Based on the statute’s text and structure, recent 
case law, and legislative history, we conclude that the thirty-
day period in § 3731 is jurisdictional.8   
   
B. 
Typically, the thirty-day appeal period under § 3731 
begins when a covered order is entered on the docket.  See 
United States v. Mallory, 765 F.3d 373, 379–80 (3d Cir. 
2014).  But if the government timely seeks reconsideration of 
the order, it is rendered nonfinal until the court decides the 
motion for reconsideration, and the thirty-day appeal period 
runs from an order denying the motion.  See United States v. 
Ibarra, 502 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1991) (per curiam); cf. United States 
v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 77–78 (1964).  Both parties in this case 
accept those two propositions.   
 
 As noted, Kalb contends the government’s failure to 
file a motion for reconsideration within thirty days of the 
suppression order’s entry strips us of jurisdiction over the 
government’s appeal of the suppression order.  In response, 
the government argues that the District Court deemed the 
motion for reconsideration “timely,” thus satisfying the 
prerequisites for stopping the appeal period.  As stated, we 
conclude that the government must file a motion for 
reconsideration within § 3731’s thirty-day period for the 
                                              
8 In so holding, we join the United States Courts of Appeals 
for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.  See United States v. Kim, 
298 F.3d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 317 F.3d 917 
(9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Cook, 599 F.3d 1208, 1212 
(10th Cir. 2010).   
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motion to keep that thirty-day period from expiring.9      
 Motions for reconsideration or petitions for rehearing 
filed within the appeal window are distinguishable from those 
that are not because the latter amount to “an attempt to 
rejuvenate an extinguished right to appeal.”  Healy, 376 U.S. 
at 77.  In Healy, the Supreme Court addressed whether a 
petition for rehearing “renders the judgment not final for 
purposes of appeal” under then-Supreme Court Rule 11(2), 
which required that an appeal be filed within thirty days.  Id. 
at 77–78.  Holding that it did, id. at 80, the Court stated, 
“[s]ince the petition for rehearing was filed within 30 days of 
the judgment, we are not faced with an attempt to rejuvenate 
an extinguished right to appeal,” id. at 77 (emphasis added).  
While that statement guides our inquiry, it does not—as Kalb 
argues—fully decide the issue because the Supreme Court 
considered a petition that was filed within the thirty-day 
appeal period.  Accordingly, we turn to a survey of our sister 
Circuits’ treatment of this issue.  
 
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit addressed an analogous scenario to this one in United 
States v. Martinez, 681 F.2d 1248 (10th Cir. 1982) (per 
curiam).  In that case, the government attempted to appeal 
under § 3731.  Id. at 1251.  It claimed that its motion for 
reconsideration, which was filed more than thirty days after 
the appealed order, tolled the appeal period.  See id. at 1252.  
The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument, stating that § 3731 is 
jurisdictional and “a motion for reconsideration does not 
                                              
9 Because the government has the full thirty days to appeal 
following the entry of judgment on a motion for 
reconsideration, we will refer to the motion for 
reconsideration as preventing the appeal period’s expiration. 
18 
 
bring new life to an order unless it is filed within the thirty 
day period for taking the appeal running from the date of the 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from.”  Id. at 1253.  
 The government attempts to distinguish this case from 
Martinez, arguing that the Tenth Circuit’s holding only 
applies to motions deemed untimely by the district court.  See 
Appellant’s Reply Br. at 9.  But, in so doing, the government 
overlooks two aspects of Martinez.  First, the district court 
considered the government’s motion for reconsideration and 
denied it on the merits, as in this case, despite later 
commenting that it was “untimely.”  Martinez, 681 F.2d at 
1251.  Second, the Tenth Circuit did not qualify its statements 
by reference to a district court’s determinations of timeliness:  
 
As we have seen from United States v. Healy, 
the motion for reconsideration has to be filed 
within thirty days following entry of the order 
or judgment.  The motion for reconsideration 
did not breathe new life into the order which 
was entered more than thirty days before the 
filing of the motion for reconsideration. 
 
Id. at 1253.  Accordingly, Martinez is not so easily 
distinguished and provides support for Kalb’s position. 
 
 When assessing the timeliness of a motion for 
reconsideration under § 3731, several of our sister Circuits 
have relied on the thirty-day period rather than the district 
court’s characterization of the motion, although none 
involved a motion filed after the thirty-day appeal period.  
See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 599 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th 
Cir. 2010) (“In a criminal case, a timely motion for 
reconsideration, defined as one filed within the time to appeal, 
19 
 
postpones the time to appeal until the court disposes of the 
motion.” (emphasis added)); Canale v. United States, 969 
F.2d 13, 15 (2d Cir. 1992) (“While we are unaware of any 
rule of criminal or appellate procedure which addresses the 
subject of timeliness of a motion for reconsideration, 
[n]umerous decisions have found the government’s 
interlocutory appeal to be timely . . . when a motion 
for . . . reconsideration was filed within thirty days following 
the order appealed from.” (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)); United States v. Vicaria, 963 F.2d 1412, 
1414 (11th Cir. 1992) (“A motion for reconsideration in a 
criminal case must be filed within the period of time allotted 
for filing a notice of appeal in order to extend the time for 
filing the notice of appeal.  Therefore, in a criminal case, the 
government has thirty days in which to seek reconsideration 
of a final judgment or other appealable order.” (citation 
omitted)). 
  
We find additional support for our conclusion in the 
legislative history of § 3731.  In April 1967, Representative 
Thomas Railsback introduced a bill, H.R. Res. 8654, 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), to add appeals from suppression 
orders to § 3731.  In his statements concerning the bill, 
Representative Railsback stated that such appeals “must of 
necessity be limited by the sixth amendment right to a speedy 
trial and the fifth amendment protection against double 
jeopardy.”  Anti-Crime Program: Hearings Before Subcomm. 
No. 5 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1530, 1531 
(1967).  Representative Railsback emphasized the safeguards 
included in the bill, particularly the thirty-day requirement: 
 
It seems also that any action by the Congress to 
provide for additional grounds for appeal by the 
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Government in criminal trials must be tightly 
drawn and must preserve all of the 
constitutional rights of the defendant.  
Therefore, I believe certain safeguards in such 
appeals are necessary.  To make sure that such 
appeal does not bring about unnecessary delay, 
such appeals must be made within 30 days.  
This is already in section 3731 of title 18 and 
would apply equally to this new provision. 
 
Id. at 1532 (emphasis added).      
The government asserts the Supreme Court has 
established “what matters in this situation is not whether a 
motion for reconsideration is timely in relation to the original 
time for appeal, but whether the motion for reconsideration is 
timely under any rule pertinent to such a motion.”  
Appellant’s Reply Br. at 5.  In support, the government cites 
Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections of Illinois, 
434 U.S. 257 (1978).  In that case, the Supreme Court 
addressed whether a motion for reconsideration filed by the 
state in habeas proceedings, beyond the ten days allowed by 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, tolled “[t]he running of 
time for filing a notice of appeal.”  Id. at 264.  The Court held 
that it did not because the motion was “untimely under the 
Civil Rules, and therefore did not toll the time for appeal 
under Appellate Rule 4(a).”  Id. at 267. 
 
Rejecting the state’s contention that the thirty-day 
period from Healy and United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6 
(1976) (per curiam), controlled, the Browder Court stated that 
“absent a rule specifying a different time limit, a petition for 
rehearing in a criminal case would be considered timely when 
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filed within the original period for review.  In a civil case, 
however, the timeliness of a motion for rehearing or 
reconsideration is governed by Rule 52(b) or Rule 59, each of 
which allows only 10 days.”  434 U.S. at 268 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  From that statement, 
the government extrapolates that the thirty-day appeal period 
under § 3731 is only a default presumption that can be 
overcome when any other rule, which would make the motion 
timely, applies or the district court treats the motion as timely.   
 
But such a reading of Browder turns the logic of the 
decision on its head.  First, the Browder Court stated that an 
untimely motion under the applicable Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure cannot render an order nonfinal:  
 
The rationale behind the tolling principle of 
[Rule 4(a)] is the same as in traditional practice: 
“A timely petition for rehearing tolls the 
running of the [appeal] period because it 
operates to suspend the finality of the 
 . . . court’s judgment, pending the court’s 
further determination whether the judgment 
should be modified so as to alter its 
adjudication of the rights of the parties.”  An 
untimely request for rehearing does not have the 
same effect. 
 
Id. at 267 (emphasis removed and second alteration in 
original) (quoting Dep’t of Banking v. Pink, 317 U.S. 264, 
266 (1942)).  That holding does not prove the converse—that 
any motion deemed timely by a district court, even if filed 





Second, in Browder, the appeal period was shortened.  
Here, the government asks us to expand its statutory period 
for appeal.  But the thirty-day period in § 3731 is 
jurisdictional.  See supra Section III.A.  To conclude that any 
motion for reconsideration, if deemed timely by a district 
court, extends the thirty-day period would be an 
impermissible extension of our jurisdiction.  Furthermore, 
that conclusion does not comport with the rationale behind 
motions for reconsideration tolling the appeal period under 
§ 3731.  As the Supreme Court stated in Dieter, “the 
consistent practice in civil and criminal cases alike has been 
to treat timely petitions for rehearing as rendering the original 
judgment nonfinal for purposes of appeal for as long as the 
petition is pending.” 429 U.S. at 8.10   
 
But, in this case, the motion for reconsideration was 
not filed until the thirty-day appeal period had elapsed.  Thus, 
for the entire thirty-day appeal period under § 3731, the 
suppression order remained final—including the day that 
period expired.  Contrary to the government’s assertions, this 
                                              
10 The District Court’s consideration on the merits of the 
motion for reconsideration does not affect our conclusion.  
Such consideration “cannot override the application of 
jurisdictional rules, as both this Court and the Supreme Court 
have held.”  State Nat’l Ins. Co. v. County of Camden, 824 
F.3d 399, 409 (3d Cir. 2016); see also Lizardo v. United 
States, 619 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2010) (concluding that an 
untimely Rule 59(e) motion did not toll the time for filing an 
appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A) 
even if the opposing party did not object and the district court 
considered the motion on the merits).     
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scenario equates to “an attempt to rejuvenate an extinguished 
right to appeal,” Healy, 376 U.S. at 77, an action we are not 
permitted to take.11  Accordingly, we conclude that a motion 
for reconsideration must be filed within the thirty-day appeal 
period specified in § 3731 in order to keep the appeal period 
from expiring.12  Because the government filed its motion for 
reconsideration more than thirty days after the suppression 
order was entered on the docket, the motion did not prevent 
                                              
11 As now-Justice Gorsuch stated when addressing whether 
the government may file successive motions for 
reconsideration under § 3731:  
[T]he Supreme Court has unequivocally 
directed that jurisdictional filing deadlines are 
not susceptible to alteration based on precisely 
the sort of equitable considerations that the 
government urges on us, explaining that “this 
Court has no authority to create equitable 
exceptions to jurisdictional requirements.”  
Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2366.  And whatever else 
one might think about this command, it surely 
must be susceptible to the Rule of the Goose 
and Gander and thus apply no less forcefully to 
the government than the habeas petitioner. 
United States v. Cos, 498 F.3d 1115, 1137 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
12 We need not address the potential effect of a motion for 
extension of time under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
4(b)(4) in this case.   
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the appeal period from elapsing, and we must dismiss the 
appeal of that order for lack of jurisdiction.13  
IV. 
 Although we lack jurisdiction to consider the 
government’s appeal of the District Court’s order granting 
Kalb’s suppression motion, we do have jurisdiction over the 
government’s appeal of the District Court order denying its 
motion for reconsideration because the government filed its 
appeal within thirty days of the issuance of that order. “The 
purpose of such a motion is to correct a clear error of law or 
to prevent a manifest injustice in the District Court’s original 
ruling.”  Dupree, 617 F.3d at 732.  “Though ‘[m]otions to 
reconsider empower the court to change course when a 
mistake has been made, they do not empower litigants . . . to 
raise their arguments, piece by piece.’”  Id. at 732–33 
(alteration in original) (quoting Solis v. Current Dev. Corp., 
557 F.3d 772, 780 (7th Cir. 2009)).  
 
 We conclude the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the government’s motion.  At the 
motion to suppress stage, the government contended that 
Kalb’s stop was lawful as an investigatory stop under Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  In its motion for reconsideration, 
the government presented two new arguments that were not 
previously raised based on Kalb’s use of the word 
“scrapping” and an attenuation argument.  The government 
also advanced a new theory, which it did not previously 
                                              
13 We recognize that our result may appear to undermine the 
collegial nature of the proceedings fostered by the parties and 
District Court.  But we are barred from evaluating equitable 
considerations.  See Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1631.     
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present to the Court, that Kalb was properly stopped as a 
witness under Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004).  In 
denying the motion for reconsideration, the District Court 
determined the government’s arguments “could as well have 
been made earlier” and were accordingly “not a proper basis 
for reconsideration.”  App. 14.  We agree and find no abuse 
of discretion in the District Court’s denial of the motion.  
          
V. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction the government’s appeal of the order granting 
Kalb’s suppression motion.  We will affirm the order denying 
the government’s motion for reconsideration.          
